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CHAPTER 5 
Corporations 
HARRY L. MANION Ill 0 
§5.1. Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Promoters: Duty to Disclose Self-
Dealing with the Corporation: Remedies. In Whaler Motor Inn, Inc. v. 
Parsons,1 the Supreme Judicial Court considered the scope of the duties 
owed by promoters to the corporation and its future shareholders when 
the promoters enter into transactions with the corporation, as well as the 
appropriate remedies when such duties have been breached. The plain-
tiff corporation sought payment for, or cancellation of, fifty-two per cent 
of the corporation's authorized capital stock that had been transferred 
to the four corporate. promoters.~ These shares had been distributed 
equally among the four-not in exchange for money, but for services 
rendered and out-of-pocket expenditures incurred in setting up the cor-
poration.3 The corporation also sought recovery of profits realized by 
one of the promoters through his sale of land to the corporation.4 
The facts of Whaler Motor Inn are illustrative of the dangers that 
inhere in self-dealing by promoters in the pre-incorporation period and 
immediately thereafter. Sometime in late 1965 the defendant-promoters 
began to discuss forming a corporation to own and operate a motel in 
the New Bedford area.'; In order to determine the most profitable loca-
tion for the motel, the promoters commissioned a feasibility study, which 
was completed in November, 1966.0 Also prior to the corporation's for-
mation, the promoters met with several motel franchisers to determine 
0 HARRY L. MANION III practices law with the firm of Hale & Dorr, Boston. 
§5.1. 1 372 ~lass. 620, 363 N.E.2d 493 (1977). 
2 The promoters were the defendants Nathaniel Lipton, Richard Parsons, David 
Freedman, and Louis Freedman. Id. at 621, 363 N.E.2d at 495. 
3 Id. at 624, 363 N.E.2d at 496. 
4 Id. at 621 n.3, 363 N.E.2d at 494-95 n.3. Additionally, the corporation sought 
cancellation of a promissory note that it gave to Parsons in connection with repur-
chase of certain shares originally issued to him. Parsons counterclaimed to enforce 
the note. In a second action, the corporation sought cancellation of the stock issued 
without payment. Id. 
5 Id. at 621, 363 N.E.2d at 495. 
6 Id. at 622, 363 N.E.2d at 495. 
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which franchise was best suited to the operation of he New Bedford 
moteP 
The corporation was organized on February 14, 1 67 with 1,000 no 
par shares authorized.8 Although a "dummy" board of directors initially 
headed the entity, this was replaced at a meeting held o October 18, 1967 
by a board consisting of the four promoters and one Li man, an outsider 
interested in investing.0 At an informal meeting held e next day, each 
of the four promoters offered to buy 130 shares in t e corporation for 
$108,000 and Lipman offered to buy 120 shares for 100,000.1° These 
offers were accepted by the corporation, and the share were later issued 
to the five. Lipman alone paid cash for his shares.U 
The other alleged fiduciary breach before the Cou t concerned land 
that the promoter Parsons had acquired and sold t the corporation. 
Well before the promoters' initial meeting, Parsons acquired a small 
parcel of New Bedford land for $2,000, upon which h at one time had 
intended to build a motel.U In July, 1966, after the v nture was under-
way, he acquired an adjacent parcel for $35,000, and secured an option 
on a third contiguous parcel. Parsons improved the p operty by arrang-
ing for the discontinuance of a public way and for th disconnection of 
utilities.13 He conveyed his two parcels and the pure ase option to the 
corporation on October 18, 1967 for an agreed upon )rice of $75,000.14 
Formed for the purpose of operating a motel, th corporation next 
directed its efforts to obtaining the funds necessary t build the motel. 
After meeting with several lenders, the promoters o tained a loan of 




1o ld. at 622-23, 363 N.E.2d at 495. 
11 Id. at 623, 363 N.E.2d at 495. This stock, dated Octob r 19, 1967, was not 
in fact issued until April 2, 1968. At that later time the ren aining 360 shares of 
the corporation were issued to subsequent outside investors. See text at note 18 
infra. 
12 Id. at 622, 363 N.E.2d at 495. 
13 Id. The Court noted that this purchase was before th feasibility study re-
ferred to in this text at note 6 supra, and before the promoters had agreed on a site. 
This apparently led the Court to conclude that Parsons had no usurped a corporate 
opportunity in making his second acquisition. The Court stat d in this connection: 
[A]ccording to the findings his later purchase and other acti ities in connection 
with the site occurred before there was solid assurance of a 11arket for the land. 
Having assumed individual risks, Parsons was entitled to an ndividual profit on 
the subsequent sale to the corporation. That profit was sma l in relation to the 
benefit obtained by the corporation. 
Id. at 630, 363 N.E.2d at 499. 
14 Id. at 623, 363 N.E.2d at 495. The master who heard t case found that the 
property had a fair market value of $150,000. ld., 363 N.E.2 at 496. 
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of the corporation. Hi The loan was secured by mortgage and was per-
sonally guaranteed by each of the four promoters.16 In addition, the 
lenders required the corporation to deposit with them $300,000, from 
which $100,000 would be used for the first construction payments,l7 
Lacking the $300,000 required for the deposit, the corporation sold its 
remaining 360 shares of capital stock to outside investors at $833 per 
share.18 
Business reverses suffered by one of the promoters led to an account-
ing. The accounting revealed that the promoters had not paid cash for 
their shares.J!l The corporation then brought the lawsuits at issue.20 
The suits were tried to a master. The superior court, after reviewing 
the master's findings, ruled that the promoters had breached their duties. 
For a remedy, the court decreed that the defendants' 520 shares must 
be restored to the corporation or cancelled, and that the defendants 
were to be credited only for their unreimbursed out-of-pocket ex-
penditures. As for the land transaction between Parsons and the corpora-
tion, the superior court required the return of all that he received for 
the land above his own costs of $37,500.21 
The Appeals Court agreed with the superior court that there had been 
breaches of duty, but held that credit should be allowed for the value 
of the promotional services as well as the unpaid expenses incurred in 
pro_moting the corporation. 22 The Appeals Court also ruled that Parsons 
need not repay the corporation since the market value for the land, as 
found by the master, exceeded the purchase price paid by the cor-
poration.23 




19 Id. at 624, 363 N.E.2d at 496. The Court stated: 
It is possible to say that such corporate records as existed would have suggested 
to a reader that cash had been paid, although an audit would show it had not 
been; but it is not indicated that any outsider consulted the records before buy-
ing. On the score of misrepresentations by the promoters, the master said that 
they stated to outsiders at various times that they were investing money in the 
purchase of stock. The master cited an instance in which there was mention of 
an investment of $100,000 by each promoter, and another instance where the 
promoters were said to be giving their services to the venture without charge. 
If these statements are to be characterized as lies, they are nevertheless equivocal 
in their nature, for the promoters had expended money and could assume that 
their services had value; on the other hand they were not making specific charges 
for their services. 
Id. at 624-25, 363 N.E.2d at 496-97. 
2o Id. at 624, 363 N.E.2d at 496. 
21 Id. at 625, 363 N.E.2d at 497. 
22 3 Mass. App. 662, 674-75, 339 N.E.2d 197, 206 ( 1975), aff'd, 372 Mass. 620, 
363 N.E.2d 493 ( 1977). 
23 Id. at 671-72, 339 N.E.2d at 204. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court, on further appellate review, was also 
of the opinion that the promoters had committed breaches of duty to 
the corporation, and thus to the outside investors.24 fine Court ruled 
that the promoters were obligated to make full disclo~ures about both 
the stock and land transactions to the outsiders as intending investors. 2.5 
There being no question that the promoters had breac~ed this duty, the 
major issue on appeal was the propriety of the remedy imposed by the 
superior court. The Court stated that recission of the sale of the 520 
shares required reimbursement of the price the prom~ters paid for the 
shares.26 Since the promoters had not tendered cash f~r the shares, the 
Court faced the question whether rendition of services could be con-
sidered payment.27 
The Court held that the defendants were entitled to Ia credit not only 
for their actual promotional expenditures, but also for the fair market 
value of their promotional services.28 Although it recognized the exist-
ence of ample authority for the superior court's actionLthat promoters 
who breach their fiduciary duties may be deprived of e~ery advantage 20 
-the Court nevertheless ruled that the facts of the instant case did not 
warrant this course. In the Court's view, such a coursr would in effect 
be the bestowal of a windfall on the corporation. 30 T~e case was thus 
remanded for a determination of the value of the promoter's services.31 
The Supreme Judicial Court's holding in Whaler Mt,Jtor Inn in effect 
required the corporation to pay for services which i~ had neither au-
thorized nor ratified. In fact, the master found that the promoters never 
had presented a claim to the corporation for services r~ndered. 32 More-
over, there was a finding that at least one of the defrndants had told 
the outside investors that the promoters did not intend to be paid for 
the performance of promotional activities undertaken in the organization 
of the corporation.~a Nevertheless, the Court concludbd that denial of 
compensation for the performance of promotional sJrvices should be 
24 372 Mass. at 625-26, 363 N.E.2d at 497. I 
25 Id. The Court predicated the breach only on the failure tp disclose the trans-
actions; it did not find any fiduciary' hrcach in Parsons' sale of the land to the 
corporation fur a profit. See note 13 supra. 
2o Id. at 627, 363 N.E.2d at 498. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 630, 363 N.E.2d at 499-500. 
20 Id. at 628, 363 N.E.2d at 498-99, citing Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 
315 Mich. 582, 586, 590-91, 24 N.W.2d 220, 222, 224 ( 19461; Wills v. Nehalem 
Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 81-82, 96 P. 528, 532-3:3 (1908); Cuba olony Co. v. Kirby, 
149 Mich. 453, 458, 112 N.W. 1133, 1135 (1907). 
so 372 Mass. at 628, 363 N.E.2d at 498-99. 
31 Id. at 630, 363 N.E.2d at 500. 
32 3 Mass. App. at 677, 339 N.E.2d at 208 (Keville, J. disserting). 
33 372 Mass. at 625, 363 N.E.2d at 496. 
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imposed as a remedy only in cases in which the promoters make active 
misrepresentations upon which the outside investors rely.34 Although 
the Court acknowledged that the defendants had assumed a proprietary 
attitude toward the corporation and had not displayed proper regard 
for the interest of the outside investors, the Court concluded that deny-
ing the· promoters compensation for their services was too drastic a 
remedy.35 
The Court attempted to draw distinctions between degrees of cul-
pability. The holding seems to indicate that the remedy for breach of 
fiduciary duty should be commensurate to the severity of fraud to which 
the corporation and its shareholders have been exposed. Such a ra-
tionale clearly diminishes the vigor of the duty owed by the promoters 
to present and future shareholders of a corporation. By allowing the 
derelict promoters to receive the full value of their services, the Whaler 
Motor Inn Court has failed to impose meaningful sanctions on such 
wrongful conduct. The decision is not consistent with the fiduciary duty 
that the promoter owes the corporation. 
As stated above,:w the Court was aware of precedent for the superior 
court's decree allowing the promoters to receive their out-of-pocket ex-
penditures but not the fair value of their services. However, the Court 
indicated that such harsh remedies are appropriate only when the pro-
moter usurps an opportunity belonging to the venture, or when the 
promoter is "conspicuously blameworthy." a• As an example of a "con-
spicuously blameworthy" promoter, the Court suggested the case in which 
the promoter has made active misrepresentations upon which outsiders 
detrimentally rely.a8 The Court stated that proof of misrepresentations 
of this character was ambiguous in the instant case.~u 
A rule denying recovery for services rendered where a promoter has 
made active misrepresentations, while permitting such recovery where 
the promoter has failed to disclose material facts to outside investors, 
does not articulate a cognizable standard by which promoter conduct 
may be judged. Such a rule focuses on the degree of culpability of the 
wrongdoer rather than on the effect of his conduct on the corporation. 
Often the damage suffered by the corporation will be the same whether 
34 I d. at 629, 363 N .E.2d at 499, citing Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 320-21, 
57 N.E. 656, 661 (1900); Koppitz-Melcher, Inc. v. Koppitz, 315 Mich. 582, 24 
N.W.2d 220 ( 1946); Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 P. 528 (1908); 
HEsTATEl\lEXT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206, Comments ( 1959); A. ScoTT, TRUSTS 
§ 170.12, at 1327-28, § 206 (3d ed. 1967). 
35 372 Mass. at 629-30, 363 N.E.2d at 499. 
36 See text and note 29 supra. 
37 372 Mass. at 629, 363 N.E.2d at 499. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 630, 363 N.E.2d at 499. 
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the promoter induced outsiders to invest by making active misrepresenta-
tions, or by the passive course of failing to disclose laterial facts. The 
distinction cleaved by the Supreme Judicial Court etween degrees of 
culpability vitiates promoters' fiduciary duties and e courages the very 
sort of proprietary attitude that the Whaler Motor Inn Court condemned. 
§5.2. Corporate Ownership of Liquor Licenses. Johnson v. Martig-
netti 1 involved a challenge to the constitutionality jf chapter 138, sec-
tion 15 of the General Laws/ which provides in ess nee that no person 
or combination of persons, directly or indirectly, sha l be granted more 
than three licenses to sell alcoholic beverages to be consumed away from 
the premises. The defendants' constitutional assault on section 15 (the 
multiple ownership law) was based on the contentipn that the statute 
contravenes the due process and equal protection cl~uses of the United 
States Constitution.a The Supreme Judicial Court utterly rejected these 
contentions. 4 
Fourteen taxpayers brought suit to abate the use 1, a building on the 
basis that it was being used unlawfully as a liquo · nuisance.5 They 
claimed that the building's use was unlawful becau e the store's liquor 
license was held by a person or combination of persons holding more 
than three package store liquor licenses.u The named defendants in-
cluded various individuals who controlled six corpolations that in turn 
held eight package store licenses. 7 These defendant operate the pack-
age stores under the name "Martignetti Liquors." The defendants 
denied any violation of the multiple ownership law and asserted their 
constitutional challenge by means of a motion to dismiss.n 
The trial court, after receiving testimony, exhibi s, and a statement 
of agreed facts, ruled that the defendants were a co bination of persons 
§5.2. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 882, 375 N.E.2d 290. 
2 G.L. c. 138 contains a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the sale, distribu-
tion, and provision of alcoholic beverages. 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 883, 375 N.E.2d at 293. l 
4 Id. at 884, 375 N.E.2d at 293. 
5 Id. at 882, 375 N.E.2d at 293. The suit actually had . dual statutory predi-
cate. G.L. c. 138, § 60 provides: "All alcoholic beverages which are kept for 
sale contrary to law and the implements and vessels actually used in selling and 
keeping the same are declared to be common nuisances." G.L. c. 139, § 16A pro-
vides the following procedure for the abatement of such a cml. mon nuisance: "Upon 
a civil action brought . . . by not less than ten legal vot rs of a town or city, 
in their own names, stating that a building . . . situated therein is being used 
for the alleged keeping, sale or manufacture of alcoholic beve age, ... the superior 
court may abate the same as a common nuisance." 
6 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 883, 375 N.E.2d at 293. 
7 Id. The trustees of Y & M Trust, owners of the Woburr real estate where the 
alleged nuisance was taking place, were also named as defe dants. Id. 
s Id. 
9 Id. I 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1978 [1978], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1978/iss1/8
§5.2 CORPORATIONS 121 
holding more than three liquor licenses, and thus were in violation of 
chapter 138, section 15. w This determination was based on the court's 
finding that the defendant corporations and individuals participated in 
a common scheme of advertising, bookkeeping, pension plans, and other 
business practices.H The court further found the existence of a common 
design to promote the name "Martignetti Liquors" with reference to all 
the stores, a history of interconnecting loan t~ansactions, and a system 
whereby each individual defendant had authority to act on behalf of 
corporations in which he was not an officer or director.12 The judge 
concluded that "the business transactions which have occurred and are 
continuing to occur between the various entities paid little if any atten-
tion to the separateness of the corporations, and are bound together in 
a common business." 13 The court then permanently enjoined the in-
dividual and corporate defendants from operating a liquor store on the 
premises.14 
On appeal, the defendants conceded that, under the Supreme Judicial 
Court's recent decision in Powers v. Sixty Broadway, Inc.,l 5 they did in 
fact own or control more than three package store licenses.16 They then 
shifted their whole attack to the constitutionality of the multiple owner-
ship law. The due process attack on the statute rested on the contention 
that the stah1te is impermissibly vague in that it fails to precisely define 
the prohibited conduct. 17 This argument was directed at that portion of 
the statute forbidding a "combination of persons, directly or indirectly" 
from holding more than three package store licenses.18 The defendants 
1o Id. at 884, 375 N.E.2d at 293. 
11 Id. at 886, 375 N.E.2d at 294. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 884, 375 N.E.2d at 293. The superior court further ordered the de-
fendants to remove all property from the store within thirty days after final judg-
ment. In addition, the court enjoined the owner of the premises from using, leasing, 
or renting the location as a package store for a period of one year from the date 
of the judgment. Id. 
15 371 Mass. 296, 356 N.E.2d 704 ( 1976). 
In Powers twelve voters sought an injunction against the use of a building as a 
package store on the grounds that such use constituted a common nuisance under 
G.L. c. 138, § 60, the same statute involved in Johnson. The illegality alleged in 
Powers was also a violation of the multiple ownership law. Powers, 371 Mass. at 
296, 356 N.E.2d at 705. In upholding the trial court's issuance of an injunction, 
the Court stated: 
Common management control is one way of violating § 15, but it is not the 
only way. Interlocking stockholders, directors and officers, family relationships, 
guidance, assistance and financial support, and joint activities warranted the 
judge's finding in the present case that there was a "combination of persons." 
Id. at 300, 356 N.E.2d at 706. 
lG 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 884, 375 N.E.2d at 293. 
17 Id. at 886, 375 N.E.2d at 294. 
1s G.L. c. 138, § 15. 
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contended that this language did not give them ade uate notice of the 
standards to which they were required to conform heir conduct.19 
Addressing the defendants' vagueness argument, t e Supreme Judicial 
Court initially noted that regulation of trade practi es must necessarily 
be in broad terms.20 The Court stated that due p ocess requirements 
are met if the statute in question sets forth guidelin s, tne meaning and 
application of which are supplied by a gradual pr cess of judicial in-
clusion and exclusion.21 After ruling that the phra es "combination of 
persons'' and "direct and indirect" ownership have w II established com-
mon law meanings, the Court considered the intend d meaning of these 
phrases as they are used in section 15. The Court s ated that the exist-
ence of a "combination of persons" may be found when two or more 
persons engage in a mutuality of action designed o effect a common 
result.22 Significantly, the Court held that in the ar a of alcoholic bev-
erage regulation, the existence of a "combination of persons" is a ques-
tion of fact which may be inferred from such eire mstantial evidence 
as the ownership of group insurance policies, co mon bookkeeping 
practices, shared employees, and substantial inter ompany dealings.23 
Thus, if distinct corporations have engaged in co mon practices and 
operations to produce a common result, they will b considered a com-
bination of persons for purposes of the "common o nership" law. 
Turning its attention to the remaining portion f section 15 under 
attack, the Court stated that the "direct or indirect" ownership of liquor 
licenses refers to ownership of a "beneficial interes in the licensed es-
tablishment."24 The Court predicated this interpreta ion on the fact that 
section 15A of chapter 138, a related statute gover ing the granting of 
liquor licenses, indicates the broad legislative co cern with business 
entities. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of th multiple ownership 
law in Johnson promotes the diverse ownership of p ckage store licenses 
by preventing the use of commonly-controlled corp rations as a vehicle 
for circumventing the law. Concentration of liq or retailing in the 
hands of a few has been said to intensify the da gers of liquor sales 
stimulations which in tum threaten trade stability.2 By establishing a 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 886-87, 375 N.E.2d at 294 See Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 ( 1972) (declaring state agrancy statute uncon-
stitutional under the due process clause on vagueness groun s). 
20 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 889, 375 N.E.2d at 295. See Commonwealth v. 
Gustafsson, 370 Mass. 187, 189-90, 346 N.E.2d 706, 711 (1976),, 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 889, 375 N.E.2d at 295. 
22 Id. at 887, 375 N.E.2d at 294. 
2s Id. at 888, 375 N.E.2d at 29S. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 892, 375, N.E.2d at 297. 
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standard for the meaning of direct or indirect ownership, the Court has 
set a qualitative limit to the legislature's quantitative limit to the holding 
of liquor licenses. 
§5.3. Stock Subscription: Action to Enforce Barred by Laches. Ger-
ber v. Ty-Data, Inc. 1 was a suit brought by two minority shareholders 
to recover shares of stock they claimed entitlement to as original sub-
scribers to the defendant corporation.~ The case was referred to a 
master who found that although the plaintiffs may have been entitled 
to a certain number of shares, their claims were barred by laches.3 The 
superior court then entered judgment for the corporation and the plain-
tiffs appealed.4 
A subsidiary finding of the master adopted by the superior court was 
that the corporation had vastly changed its position between 1969, the 
year of the subscription agreement, and May 30, 1973, the date the suit 
was filed." The master found that due to the plaintiffs' delay in en-
forcing the agreement the defendant corporation would suffer legal 
prejudice and disadvantage if recovery were permitted.6 Accordingly, 
the Appeals Court upheld the master's finding that the plaintiffs' claim 
was barred by laches.7 
The facts reported by the Appeals Court are sparse and provide no 
clear guidelines for applying the equitable doctrine of laches to the 
future enforcement of subscription agreements. However, the Gerber 
decision does stand as a warning to those share subscribers who con-
template deferring enforcement of subscription agreements until such 
time as the stock's value may rise. Gerber demonstrates that the de-
fense of laches may be sucessfully interposed to frustrate such spec-
ulation. 
§5.3. t 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1229, 370 N.E.2d 445. 




6 Id., 370 N.E.2d at 446-47. 
7 Id., 370 N.E.2d at 447. 
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